Lawyer’s name suppression bid fails
February 13, 2012
Criminal lawyer Barry Hart’s long attempt to have his name suppressed for his disciplinary tribunal charges has failed at the final hurdle, having also failed pretty much all the hurdles before that. The Supreme Court said:
The likely particular impact of publicity on [the person applying for suppression] will always be relevant, but it is untenable to suggest that professional people of high public profile, such as the applicant, have anything approaching a presumptive entitlement to suppression.
Topics: Name suppression | 1 Comment »
Online defamation: is it any different?
January 30, 2012
This is my column in NZ Lawyer magazine for 27 January 2012.
Are the laws of defamation different online?
Alas, the courts seem to pay little respect to this line of jurisprudence. Early on, it was apparent that anyone who believed the online world somehow gazumps defamation laws was in for a nasty surprise. “I know no forum in which an individual has the freedom to say what he likes and in any manner he wishes about another individual citizen with immunity from suit for all consequences,” said Judge Ross in 2001. “Merely because the publication is being made to cyberspace does not alter this.” (O’Brien v Brown [2001] DCR 1065).
That’s your standard legal analysis. It’s still the best starting point. But a few recent cases suggest that things may be starting to shift a bit. Some judges seem receptive to an argument that readers of some online postings won’t take them seriously. This has been described as the “ALL-CAPS” defence to defamation.
More recently, a superior court judge in Ontario issued a remarkable decision granting summary judgment against a plaintiff for an attack against him made on a website (Baglow v Smith 2011 ONSC 5131). He was a prominent political blogger called, for reasons best known to himself, “Dr Dawg”, though it was well known that his real name was John Baglow. Baglow argued that Omar Khadr, a 15-year-old Canadian national captured by US forces in Afghanistan and taken to Guantanamo Bay, should be repatriated. A right-wing blogger accused Baglow of being “one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters”. In fact, Baglow had frequently criticised the Taliban as dangerous, theocratic and tyrannical.
The judge found these words were protected by the defence of fair comment (here, honest opinion). Maybe that’s so. But he also found that they weren’t defamatory in the first place. How did he figure that? His most convincing justification was that readers would think that “one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters” was not literally true but merely shorthand for “he’s effectively helping the regime.” Still, that’s not enormously convincing. For one thing, it’s not clear why readers would reach that conclusion. For another, it still seems a bit defamatory. Most importantly, the judge’s job was to weed out meanings that the words were incapable of bearing. Can it really be suggested that those words weren’t capable of meaning… just what they said? The judge seems to have usurped the jury’s function, which was to determine the actual meaning.
But the judge then lists other, even more interesting, reasons for his conclusion:
Internet blogging is a form of public conversation. By the back and forth character it provides an opportunity for each party to respond to disparaging comments before the same audience in an immediate or a relatively contemporaneous time frame. This distinguishes the context of blogging from other forms of publication of defamatory statements…
He said in many online environments, readers expect cut and thrust. They expect a defamatory statement to be parried. He said a “simple rejoinder” (he even went to the trouble of drafting one) could have “nipped in the bud” the risk to the plaintiff’s reputation.
In essence, I am suggesting that the Court, in construing alleged defamatory words in an ongoing debate, should determine whether the context of the comment from the perspective of the reasonable reader or listener is one that anticipates a rejoinder, which would eliminate the possible consequence of a statement lowering the reputation of the plaintiff in their eyes.
This seems to involve heroic assumptions. Why would readers necessarily discount an unrebutted statement? Why would a rebuttal necessarily undo all the harm? Still, putting aside its lack of coherence (it’s under appeal) the decision can still be seen as part of a trend: it treats online speech as distinctive; it suggests the best remedy for harmful speech is further debate; it incentivises rights of reply; it may reflect a sense that that the ICBM of defamation law is an inappropriate response to an online foodfight.
A US judge last year also refused to recognise online attacks as harmful. A bankruptcy specialist working at Obsidian Finance sued the author of “obsidianfinancesucks.com” (Obsidian Finance Group v Cox USDC, Oregon, 23 August 2011) for calling him a fraudster, thief, and liar who had engaged in corruption, pay-offs and cover-ups. The judge said that blogs “are a subspecies of online speech which inherently suggest that statements made there are not likely provable assertions of fact”.
Bear in mind that in the US, the First Amendment gives statements categorised as opinions a bulletproof jacket against defamation suits. And it’s certainly true that the blogger used lots of capitals, bold type and hyperbolic language, which many would have seen as clues to her credibility.
Still, the implicit assumption that inflammatory blogs are so overheated as to be self-evidently harmless seems questionable. I’m inclined to think a proportion of us (not me or you, of course) are credulous enough to lap this sort of attack up. Others may at least wonder whether there’s any fire under all that smoke. Are the victims of such attacks to be left without remedy?
Which takes us again back to the Law Commission’s search for the Holy Grail: a speedy, effective, and cheap means of determining online disputes like this. Should we set up a Communications Tribunal or Commissioner? The Commission is still taking submissions…
Topics: General | 2 Comments »
Silly old TVNZ
January 27, 2012
This is why I don’t like doing TV. I gave TVNZ news an interview on the teapot saga yesterday, explaining my views as below that the risk is low for anyone who publishes the contents of the tape.
Their broadcast asserts as a fact that “we can’t broadcast what was said for legal reasons”. Later the reporter says “legal experts” (who are the others, I wonder?) say police will struggle to charge the leakers, and then there’s me saying that it’s hard to see how the police could prove the publishers knew they were publishing an illegally obtained recording. Of course, that also applies to the media, not just the leakers.
So why is it that TVNZ can’t publish for legal reasons?
Topics: Internet issues, Journalism and criminal law, Media ethics | 50 Comments »
Teapot pours out
January 26, 2012
Someone’s put the teapot tape online. That’s the conversation between the PM and ACT candidate John Banks that cameraman Bradley Ambrose said he inadvertently recorded, during the most covered cuppa in NZ history.
The media, and even many bloggers, seem hesitant about linking to it. I’m not.
Here’s why. Put aside the question of whether it was in fact an offence for Ambrose to have recorded the investigation. The police are investigating that, and the High Court has refused to rule on it. The question is whether the media (and new media) can publish the contents. Now, it is an offence to intentionally disclose an illegally intercepted private communication – but only if you know that it has been illegally intercepted. If anyone wants to prosecute me, they’ll have to prove those two things beyond reasonable doubt.
And here’s the thing: I don’t know that it was an illegally intercepted private conversation.
What I know is that several experts (like Dean Knight and Andrew Geddis) have argued that it can’t possibly have been. The police would have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that Ambrose intentionally recorded the conversation. The police would also have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the conversation was private – that is, that Banks and Key ought not to have reasonably expected it to be overheard.
It seems to me that there’s plenty of doubt about whether an offence has occurred. Ambrose says that he recorded it inadvertently. And there were 25 journalists around with powerful microphones very close by. I think that at best the case against Ambrose is arguable and on my best assessment of the law, I think it will fail.
I also think that a Bill of Rights-consistent reading of the law would allow publication by media in these circumstances, and the police’s prosecution guidelines would suggest that it’s futile to take action against anyone. I don’t think the legal risk is high for anyone in publishing or linking to the contents of the tape.
[I also note that if it’s an offence to publish or link to the contents now, it was also an offence for Winston Peters to disclose – and the media to report – the contents (and in fact, even the existence) of the recording last year. There’s been no suggestion that I’ve heard of any criminal investigation into that. What’s more, as far as the law’s concerned, there’s no difference between linking to the material and describing any of its contents. Some media seem to be pussy-footing around, telling us a bit about what the tapes say but declaring that it’s illegal to publish them directly. But they can’t have it both ways. Both are disclosing the contents – if one’s an offence, both are.]
Given that the tape is not particularly damning for the PM or Banks, and has now been widely listened to online, I wonder whether they shouldn’t just bite the bullet and consent now…
Topics: Journalism and criminal law, NZ Bill of Rights Act | 116 Comments »
Confessions of a tabloid journalist
January 17, 2012
For those who just caught be on Nine-to-Noon, those who’ve read Nick Davies’ excellent Flat Earth News, and those who are just interested in what goes on behind the scenes at UK tabs, here’s an insider’s expose, from former Daily Star journo Richard Peppiatt, who gave evidence to the Leveson inquiry.
Highlights: journalists never take a bit of notice of the Press Complaints Commission Code, they don’t give a stuff about the odd ruling against them, many stories are basically just made up or exaggerated beyond recognition, and stories are cut to fit the ideology of the paper. Oh, Peppiatt was once asked to track down Susan Boyle and propose to her. (She told him to piss off).
You might also be interested in his resignation letter.
Topics: Media ethics | 49 Comments »
Public expectations and media standards
December 14, 2011
The Law Commission suggests that its proposed independent media regulator consult with the public to establish what their expectations are of journalistic standards, so that these can be reflected in the structures and ethics codes it draws up (see paras 5.93 and 6.95).
Is this really the right question? I rather doubt it. If you’re asking what standards the public expect of the media, new and old, I wouldn’t be surprised if you got some fairly cynical responses.
But I suppose it’s implicit in this that we’re asking them what standards they think the media should be held to. Even then, is this a sensible question? When the BSA conducted a survey about what people’s expectations of privacy and the media were, they discovered that people disagreed wildly about it.
I really wonder whether many people have really thought about it. Do we want journalistic standards to be determined by what a bunch of random people happen to pull out of their heads when someone phones them? Why should we think their answers will be grounded in the realities of news-gathering or forged by the experience of being the subject of news stories? Aren’t we really more interested in what standards people desire after they’re schooled up on the issues?
If that’s the case, why are we going to the public at all? Do we go to the public when we’re setting ethical standards for lawyers or accountants? Consumer standards? I don’t think we do. We consult experts, talk to people engaged in the issues, look at best practice elsewhere, look for evidence and convincing reasoning about what works and best reflects the values we identify as important. In fact, that’s the way the Law Commission goes about its business. At some point it invites public submissions, and generally only gets responses from stakeholders. It doesn’t tend to conduct public surveys about what the law should be.
I’m not saying we shouldn’t seek public feedback. But we shouldn’t expect it to provide any clear answers, and in many cases it probably won’t even provide thoughtful ones. We’ve got a very good idea about what constitutes ethical journalism from the similarity of hundreds of codes of ethics around the world and the experience of veteran journalists. Maybe we need to think harder about exactly which questions we want public feedback on and what information we provide people with first…
Topics: Media ethics | 50 Comments »
Law Commission’s new media paper
December 12, 2011
The Law Commission has issued an issues paper on reform of news media and new media regulation. This isn’t a final report; they’re looking for feedback on their proposals.
I think it’s a thougthful and well-researched paper. It’s very much alive to the problems of online regulation and the importance of free speech and the media. It contains some big ideas, some of which are getting lost in reporting by journalists who don’t seem to have read it.
It’s in two parts. The first is about regulation of – for want of a better phrase – mainstream media. That is, the media whose business it is to regularly deliver news and views. That includes TV and radio, newspapers and magazines. But should it also include Scoop and Voxy? Aren’t they part of the mainstream now? Why should a Scoop reporter not get the privileges (such as exemption from the Privacy Act, journalist source protection and access to courts) that other media outlets get? Correspondingly, why should they be exempt from some sort of complaints process concerning things like accuracy, fairness and privacy?
This part of the paper (it’s the first six chapters) also asks whether our patchwork of media regulation makes any sense. Given that broadcasters are posting text online and newspapers are posting video, why should the standards applying to each be different? Why should one be governed by the (self-regulated) Press Council and the other by the (statutory) Broadcasting Standards Authority? Why should broadcasters’ websites not be regulated at all?
The second part of the paper looks at online harms such as cyber-bullying and harrassment, privacy invasions, defamation, impersonation and inciting suicide. It does not focus particularly on the media. It asks whether the remedies available for such harms – the criminal law, civil law such as defamation, and complaints organisations such as the Privacy Commissioner – are adequate.
Part One
At the heart of Part One is the vexed question of “who is a journalist?” Do you have to work for the NZ Herald or TVNZ? Or might you be a blogger like David Farrar who is regularly providing news, analysis and sometimes original research in ways that make his activities similar? This matters: regular journalists get particular privileges: an exemption from the Privacy Act’s data management requirements; legal rights to protect their sources; access to court proceedings when the public are excluded; the right to attend particular press conferences. The law is a bit of a mess here, but the idea is that the media is (a) performing an important public function and (b) reliably trustworthy in how it uses information. The Law Commission suggests that these attributes are not restricted to old-style media.
The Commission says that if some new media news outlets are performing traditional media functions – informing people on the issues of the day – they should get these privileges too. But with those privileges comes responsibility. They should be subject to a code of ethics and a complaints process.
We already have a couple of those: the Press Council and the BSA. Will they do? The Law Commission doesn’t think so. They are really pre-internet-age beasts, it says. The BSA’s codes are (partly) prescribed by statute and the appointments are political. It doesn’t have jurisdiction of broadcasters’ websites. The Press Council’s “statement of principles” are a bit waffly and the organisation can be seen as stacked toward the media industry, which funds it and provides five out of eleven Press Council members. Neither organisation has code provisions that specifically reflect the online environment, though both contain general requirements (eg fairness) that are capable of applying online.
As newspapers’ and broadcasters’ content looks increasingly similar, these separate regimes are looking increasingly untenable, says the Law Commission. It is surely right. What should we have instead? The Commission recommends a single regulator. It’s hallmark will be independence: the Commission recommends a very robust appointment process to ensure the regulator is insulated from politicians and from the media industry. Like the BSA, it would have a statutory basis, but unlike the BSA, this statutory basis will not be very prescriptive. For example, it won’t set out what is required to be in the codes. These will be prepared by the members of the regulator, in consultation with the public and the industry. The regulator will also develop its own complaints processes, and will decide on the range of penalties that can be imposed. (It seems that this may require buy-in from the industry).
There is a bit of tension here. On the one hand, the Commission is suggesting a lot of independence for this regulator to make decisions about how it will operate. On the other hand, the Commission’s paper contains quite a bit of detail about how it expects the regulator will operate – creating high standards for the media (“setting the bar high”); dealing with ethical principles such as accuracy, privacy and fairness; drawing up a code of ethics that is more detailed than the Press Council one and contains variations according to the particular form of media; and naming the journalists who are subjected to complaints.
How are we to read this? I think the idea is that the regulator essentially gets licence to do what it likes. But it will be operating against the recommendations in the Law Commission’s final report (to be delivered after feedback on this one), so if it ignores those recommendations or otherwise acts contrary to the public interest, it may be replaced by a stricter statutory regime.
That’s the way I look at the recommendation – not as a statutory super-regulator, but as a slightly refined self-regulatory initiative, in which the industry players are given a first chance to see whether they can do this themselves.
Complaints would still go in the first instance to the publisher or broadcaster, and would only be referred to the regulator in the event they can’t be resolved.
The Commission doesn’t discuss fast-track resolution, or interim take-down powers, or a possible Ombudsman/mediator to faciliate resolution before complaints are elevated, but all are on the table for the regulator.
Who would join? The Commission assumes that all the current mainstream media organisations would want to: joining provides a brand advantage, it gains them journalistic privileges, it protects them against the possibility of heavier regulation. Maybe joining should be entirely voluntary, it suggests.
I’m not so sure that all the media would want to opt in. They will have to part-fund it; it will carry obligations and the potential for rulings and penalties they disagree with, and the basket of privileges they get in return may not be enticing enough. They can still get almost all court access as members of the public. Not many will turn them away from press conferences. Would the law seriously take away TV3’s source protection rights and subject them to the Privacy Act if they didn’t join?
The Commission’s Plan B is to make membership compulsory for large, mostly traditional media, and optional for others. So the NZ Herald and TVNZ would be required to be members; Farrar could opt in. (I’m inclined to think there should probably be some sort of limit on those who could decide to opt in – after all, this means that they will be granted privileges as journalists, and merely signing up to a code and complaint process doesn’t automatically render someone responsible, I’d have thought).
That’s it in a nutshell. Worthy of serious consideration and debate, I think.
Part Two
This seems to have attracted more attention. In this part of the paper (the final two chapters), the Law Commission assesses the harms that are done by bloggers, tweeters and social media posters. It says it’s a bit hard to tell how much harm is being done, but finds plenty of evidence that there’s a significant amount. What’s to be done? Three things.
First (this recommendation is getting lost in the debate), the courts should be empowered to require ISPs and website hosts to take down material if it has been established that they are unlawful and harmful and that other measures have not worked. The Commission expects that this would be rarely used.
Second, they suggest tweaking the criminal law to ensure that it applies properly online. Mostly, this is just a matter of clarification – the Harrassment Act and Human Rights Act, for example, probably already apply on an online context. But some involve creating new offences: malicious impersonation, and perhaps publication of intimate photographs online where the photos were taken with consent but the publication of them wasn’t.
Third, and most interesting, a new mechanism for speedy, law-cost and effective remedy for online harms – against anyone, including the media, but also including bloggers, etc. The remedies would include compensation, take-down order, right of reply, and apology. The Commission raises two options here. First, a new Tribunal to hear such claims. It could make orders, but only when it could be shown that the law had been broken. Effectively, it turns the relevant criminal law into statutory torts (along with the civil law such as privacy and defamation – and copyright?) and makes them subject to a more accessible, informal and cheap complaints process.
I’m afraid I can see all sorts of problems with this. How do you quickly and cheaply establish whether or not someone has been defamed? It’s an incredibly complex area of law, and I don’t see how a Tribunal could establish it quickly and cheaply if someone wanted to raise some defences. And how would the Tribunal’s powers dovetail with the rules laid down by the courts for injunctions? For example, the courts are very reluctant to order an injunction removing particular material that’s allegedly defamatory if the defendant points to an arguable defence.
More importantly, what happens to the underlying crimes? If I’m charged with criminal harrassment, or under investigation for it, then if I’m defending myself before the Tribunal, I might be undermining my own criminal defence. What of the protections that are usually provided to someone facing a criminal charge? What if the Tribunal’s ruling has the potential to prejudice my later criminal trial? Is the standard of proof to be lower?
Again, the Commmission has a Plan B – a communications commissioner. This person would have some powers to require information, and an investigatory role, but would not be able to order take-down, compensation, etc. He or she would need to rely on the mana of the office to try to negotiate solutions.
The Law Commission is dealing with a very real problem here. Seriously harmful material can be posted at the drop of a hat, and even if the criminal provisions were extended and clarified as the Commission suggests, the remedies may be cumbersome and expensive. But I have to wonder whether either of these options will do the trick. The first seems fraught with problems and the second, while potentially useful, seems toothless.
On the other hand, I’m not sure that I have any better ideas…
Topics: Defamation, Future of journalism, Harassment Act, Internet issues, Journalism and criminal law, NZ Bill of Rights Act | 853 Comments »
Should the Treasury asset-sales advice have been released?
November 29, 2011
The Chief Ombudsman Beverley Wakem says no. OIA expert John Edwards isn’t so sure. He provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis of her decision here.
Under the OIA, you’re entitled to see almost any information held by the government just by asking for it. To withhold information, the government must point to one of the specific exceptions in the Act (which are about personal privacy, commercial prejudice, damage to the policy-making process and the like) and explain (a) how the release of the information would cause harm to that interest and (b) why the public interest in the disclosure of the information doesn’t outweigh that harm.
As John explains, the government here has pointed to the very nebulous exceptions that protect policy advice. It is easy for the government to make assertions about the evils that will befall us if advice is released prematurely. My impression is that the Ombudsmen are sometimes too ready to accept those assertions. John gives us reasons to doubt the validity of the reasons the government gave here – the reasons that were accepted by the Ombudsmen’s office.
But there is one part of the Ombudsmen’s decision that gives me some comfort:
Whilst there is an exceptionally strong public interest in disclosure of information that may help voters to decide how to exercise their vote, I am not persuaded that the specific information concerned in this case would provide such assistance.
The Chief Ombudsmen was certainly alive to the democratic importance of relevant political information. But she says here, essentially, that there’s not much in this Treasury advice that’s of relevance to the election. If she’s right, then all the criticism her decision has attracted may be unfair (though you could be forgiven for wondering why the government is so keen to withhold it). In a different election cycle, this might have been the storm in a teacup.
As John points out, we will get to see the Treasury advice one day, though of course it’s too late for the election. Then we’ll be able to make up our own minds about its significance and properly evaluate the Chief Ombudsman’s decision…
Topics: Official Information Act | 49 Comments »
How to door-step someone
November 29, 2011
John Campbell has demonstrated, with immaculate ethics, how to go about door-stepping someone. Door-stepping is turning up to someone’s place with cameras rolling to get that person to answer questions. As the BSA has often said, it’s usually unfair to do this.
But the Campbell Live crew weren’t unfair. They were doing a story on Tower Insurance. They’d talked to a punter whose property was in Christchurch’s red-zone. His insurance policy was a replacement one. Tower was going to pay for repairs but not replace his home somewhere else. Campbell Live called Tower three times, and filled out a media inquiry form. Tower didn’t respond.
So Campbell went to Tower’s office to try to get a response. Here’s how you deal with the poor receptionist in a situation like that:
Campbell: I am so sorry just to walk up to you like this, but we have tried tremendously hard to get somebody to talk to us about the situation in Christchurch with replacement polices in the red zone. Now, we know absolutely that that is not your job and your department. But we have been trying to get somebody to talk to us, no one returns calls. Is there anyone here that can deal with the media on that subject?
The receptionist was shown competently dealing with the situation. I’m not sure the same can be said of Tower’s head honcho. Campbell was first told that he was in a meeting, and replied, with the sort of effusive courtesy that only Campbell can muster:
Sorry, this is a terribly difficult situation for you… Would you mind passing on to them that we are utterly happy to wait for them, they look like comfortable seats, we are very happy to wait until they are available.
The CEO then decided he wouldn’t be available at all. Campbell left an invitation to appear on the programme that night.
The BSA has said door-stepping should be a last resort. It should only be used when other attempts to contact the person have failed. In this case, the BSA added another requirement that seems spot on: that the door-step be a genuine attempt to elicit information (and not, for example, just an excuse to get some sexy footage of someone refusing to answer questions).
The BSA concluded, quite rightly, that Campbell’s behaviour wasn’t unfair here.
Still, Tower made another complaint of unfairness relating to a different point. I’m more sympathetic to this one. About an hour and a half before the programme, they emailed a statement to Campbell Live. It said that “there appeared to be some misunderstandings circulating about the nature of the cover available under home insurance policies” and added:
- Tower’s home insurance policies covered customers against accidental physical damage to their houses. The policies did not cover damage to land (which was insured under the Earthquake Commission Act 1993) or damage to public infrastructure. Where a customer’s house suffered damage as a result of a natural disaster, Tower’s home insurance policies provided “top-up” cover for physical damage to the house over and above cover available from the Earthquake Commission. This was not unique to Tower.
- Tower acknowledged that residents in the red zones were considering abandoning their properties because the government had decided that it was not feasible to reinstate land and infrastructure in those areas. It accepted that some residents living in the red zone, particularly those whose houses had not been severely damaged, had no practical alternative to selling their property to the government even though the price the government was proposing to pay may be less than the property’s market value prior to the earthquake. Tower sympathised with residents in this position, however, it could not make up the shortfall by giving customers more than their full entitlement under their policy.
Campbell Live summarised that email this way:
We received an email from Tower saying that they are working hard to ensure that claims are resolved fairly and efficiently and that the concerns currently being expressed are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the cover available under home insurance policies.
Then he added:
Frankly, that statement raises at least as many questions as it answers. What does replacement mean?
Yes, that letter was sent late in the day. To be fair to Tower, though, they were first contacted about the story that morning. And there’s surely no doubt that Campbell Live could have made time for a longer summary. Campbell Live complained that it would have taken more than 3 minutes to read the statement out in full. But they certainly had some time available: after all, they were offering to do an interview with the Chief Executive and would certainly have made time for that. Besides, Tower was only looking for a fair summary. What happened, I think, was that Campbell Live didn’t like the format of the response, and they short-changed it.
Was it really fair on Tower not to explain that its policy is a top-up for the Earthquake Commission land-damage cover? The BSA thought so:
In our view, while this provided only a very concise representation of Tower’s position, it was sufficient in the context of the programme, which sought to simplify a complicated legal matter for the average viewer.
I disagree. In the context of a show that criticised Tower strongly, dramatised that criticism with a door-stepping, suggested Tower was breaching its own “core value” of empathy to customers, and slagged Tower for failing to front up and explain its policy, it was unfair for Campbell Live not to do a better job of conveying the explanation Tower did give.
So I think it the programme was unfair. But given that Tower then continued to refuse to come on the show and explain its position, I don’t think any penalty was called for, beyond upholding that aspect of the complaint.
Topics: Broadcasting Standards Authority | 45 Comments »
John Key backs MMP
November 25, 2011
I think you should vote to retain MMP on Saturday. But don’t listen to me. Listen to John Key. “Every vote counts,” he said this morning. He’s right, and it’s one of the best features of MMP.
It’s not true (or not nearly as true) for any of the other voting systems. It’s not really true of SM, the system Key says he prefers.
Key has also been constantly telling us that he has delivered, and will deliver “strong, stable government”. Of course, that’s under MMP.
But the refrain from the anti-MMP crowd is that MMP is a recipe for instability.
Of course, MMP has also delivered a much more diverse Parliament. It has forced them to discuss and compromise over issues. Debates are informed by a good range of competing political viewpoints. Politics is more interesting. Parliament is no longer the lapdog of the executive.
And it’s fairer. Looking back on those elections where parties governed without majority support (or even an arrangement backed by parties with majority support) or got 20% of the vote and only two MPs…. it seems ridiculous that anyone would want to turn back the clock. I’m going to be ticking STV with my second referendum vote. It’s complicated, but generally fair.
I love having two votes – one for the party I like and one for the person I want to be able to turn to if I have a problem that a politician might be able to help with.
Of course, there are now no wasted votes in the safe electorates. As Key says, “Every vote counts”. He’ll go far, that fellow.
Topics: General | 2 Comments »
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